



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Nationalism in French North Africa

by Benjamin Rivlin

Protests against French rule by Tunisian and Moroccan nationalist leaders and action by France to stem nationalist agitation in Tunisia have brought to the boiling point disturbing developments in French North Africa that had hitherto attracted little attention in the United States. In the Maghreb (Arabic for "west," the name by which Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are known in the Muslim world) France is on the defensive, confronted by the mounting strength of the dissident nationalist movements in each of the North African territories demanding liberation from colonial rule.

World opinion, long oblivious to developments and conditions in Northwest Africa, is now becoming increasingly aware of the growing tension in the area, particularly since the question of Morocco has been brought before the sixth United Nations General Assembly in Paris and since North Africa has been assigned an important role in the Western defense system.

The crisis in French North Africa has been developing for many years. It can be traced back to the very outset of French penetration into each of the territories, particularly in

Algeria and Morocco where France met with fierce armed resistance that took decades to overcome. In the ensuing years a combination of French policy, the general revival in Muslim countries and the impact of Western civilization fostered Franco-Muslim tension in North Africa.

France concentrated on developing the North African territories as areas for French colonization and as appendages to the economy of the metropolitan country. The political, economic and social advancement of the natives was incidental to the needs and desires of the European settlers in North Africa. The preparation of the native population for greater responsibility in the conduct of its affairs was not stressed by French policy. However, the economic improvements brought about by the influx of French capital could probably not have been accomplished by the natives themselves.

The coming of the French brought the Maghreb and a fair number of native North Africans into direct contact with new Western ideas as well as with Western technology. The liberal-democratic tradition of the Western world with its concepts of freedom,

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equality and self-determination of people provided the ideological inspiration for the nationalist challenge to French rule in North Africa. The sharp contrasts in living standards that emerged between the French and native populations served to inspire the dissident and militant nationalist movements in the Maghreb. Since the end of World War I the nationalists have been waging a continuous and determined struggle against French rule, starting slowly and moderately with demands for reforms and changes within the context of French policy and culminating during the past year with categorical demands for independence.

Although the French probably would have preferred to ignore the existence of the nationalists, they have not been entirely impervious to nationalist clamor. In fact the French have at various times made fairly significant changes in their policy by way of concessions to nationalist demands. The reforms or new policies, however, have usually been grudgingly conceded and, as has proved true throughout the colonial world, nationalism has tended to outrun reform.

Even when France has seen some merit in the nationalist complaints, as was the case under the Popular Front governments of the mid-30's, and has sought to introduce much needed reforms, this has not been an easy task. For in its relations with the North African indigenous population the French government has to reckon with approximately 2 mil-

lion European settlers (predominantly French, but including also substantial numbers of Italians and Spaniards) who live in North Africa and have aspirations diametrically opposite to those of the nationalists.

The presence of this *colon* element, as it is called, seriously complicates the political atmosphere in the Maghreb. For the *colons*, many of whose grandparents settled in North Africa, the region is home, and they mean to keep it so. The thought of even considering the nationalist claims as a basis for discussion is totally abhorrent to most of them. Consequently, the *colons* have waged and continue to wage a relentless struggle against the aspirations of the nationalists. In this struggle their chief weapon is the influence they wield over the metropolitan government by virtue of the seats that Algeria holds in the French National Assembly and of their close ties with metropolitan commercial interests.

Series of Crises

The intensity of the nationalist crisis, gathering slowly between the two world wars, has sharply increased since 1940 and especially during the past six years. Defeat by the Nazis greatly diminished the prestige of the French among the native populations. The encouragement this turn of events gave the nationalists in North Africa cannot be overestimated.

The hopes of the nationalists were further fanned by the principles of the Atlantic Charter and by the

Charter of the United Nations. As nationalist pressure mounted after World War II French North Africa experienced one nationalist crisis after another. Anticolonialist successes in the Near East and South-east Asia have also contributed to the sharpening of tension in the Maghreb. The nationalists have intensified their demands for concessions leading to independence in the not too distant future; while the French have taken measures to forestall a repetition in North Africa of developments that have occurred elsewhere in the Muslim world.

One of the most significant aspects of the recent increase in nationalist activity has been the growing popular identification of the nationalist movement. It is difficult to determine just how deeply nationalist ideology has penetrated into native society. The original inspiration of the nationalist movement came, not from the downtrodden masses, but from a small fraction of the native population—the upper classes, the intelligentsia and the urban *bourgeoisie*. For the most part the masses, because of widespread illiteracy and lack of education, were not and still are not sophisticated enough politically to understand the meaning of nationalism or appreciate the nationalist program.

In the past the nationalist leaders enlisted mass support by playing on the ever-present native disaffection for French rule and the emotional themes of religious unity. The bulk of the people, however, were not conscious of the nationalist move-

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ment. Recently, however, the masses have become increasingly aware of the nationalists and have consciously identified themselves with the movement. There are signs that the popular recognition of nationalism has taken place not only in the urban communities, traditional centers of nationalist activity, but also in the interior among the back-hill tribesmen and agriculturists.

While the underlying problem is the same throughout the Maghreb, the situation varies from territory to territory because of certain basic differences in historical background, physical conditions, political status and socio-economic organization. The fact that France occupied all three territories not at one time but over a period of almost a century helps to explain much of the diversity that has developed in the three territories.

Varied Political Status

Perhaps one of the most striking points of difference is presented by the differences in their respective political status. Algeria is juridically referred to as "an integral part of France," and as such it elects representatives to the French National Assembly. Tunisia and Morocco, by contrast, are nominally sovereign states, over which France exercises a protectorate by virtue of treaties entered into with the local native sovereigns, the Bey of Tunisia (1881) and the Sultan of Morocco (1912).

It is therefore not surprising that there should be three distinct nationalist movements, each of which is locked in battle with a distinct French administration in each of the three Maghrebi territories. To be sure, the fact that the nationalists of each of the territories share common goals against a common adversary presents the opportunity for a concerted effort. However, there is

no over-all nationalist movement for the entire Maghreb. Nationalism in French North Africa is particularist—Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian. The French administrations, moreover, present very strong barriers to effective liaison between the populations of the three territories. Those Pan-Maghreb organizations that have appeared during the past 30 years—such as *L'Etoile Nord Africaine* during the late 20's and more recently the North African Defense Committee—have been unions of nationalists in exile.

Morocco has been in a perpetual state of crisis since the autumn of 1950 when the Sultan requested a revision of the protectorate treaty so as to hasten the independence of the country. During the past year many spokesmen of the nationalist party (*Istiqlal*, which means "independence") have been jailed and exiled; the Sultan, who is both the religious and the temporal leader of Morocco, came close to being deposed by the French when he strongly supported the nationalists; and there have been several serious outbreaks of violence despite stringent measures taken by the French authorities. The nub of the difficulty in Morocco is a series of so-called reforms which the French have been trying for several years to induce the Sultan to approve and some of which he regards as an infringement on Morocco's future sovereignty. The net effect of the events of 1951 has been to strengthen the position of the nationalists, largely as a result of the close identification of the *Istiqlal* party with the Sultan.

In Tunisia the French have pursued a somewhat different policy. In collaboration with the leading nationalist party, the *Neo-Destour* (New Constitutional), led by Habib Bourguiba, the French during the past year have introduced reforms

aimed at bringing the nationalists into the actual administration of the protectorate. Thus, since February 1951 nationalists have occupied important positions in the Tunisian cabinet. The nationalists, however, look on the recent reforms as just the beginning and are pressing for immediate action on further steps in the direction of autonomy. Franco-Tunisian negotiations on this question in the fall proved futile, hence the present impasse. The nationalists point to neighboring Libya, a former Italian colony, which attained its independence last December through United Nations efforts, even though the Libyans are less prepared than the people in French North Africa to govern themselves. Counteracting the nationalists in Tunisia is a strong *colon* element, which has condemned the reforms and has blocked their implementation.

Algerian Problem

Of the three territories, perhaps the most difficult situation exists in Algeria, whose juridical status presents a fundamental problem. Algeria has been longest under French rule and is most closely linked to France. It is in Algeria that the European settlers are most entrenched. In contrast to Tunisia and Morocco where all the accouterments of a native regime have been preserved, there are not even any vestiges of native political institutions in Algeria.

For many years French policy in Algeria aimed at "assimilation"—the "Frenchification" of the native. Only a very small fraction of the native population, however, was assimilated. Inasmuch as assimilation, to the Algerian Muslim, meant giving up his own cultural traditions and customs and accepting those of the French, it was hardly successful and

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Should U. S. Restrict East-West Trade?

by Senator James P. Kem

Senator Kem, Republican of Missouri, a graduate of the University of Missouri and of the Harvard Law School, practiced law in Kansas City from 1913 until he was elected to the Senate in 1946. He is the author of the Kem Amendment.

A YEAR before Pearl Harbor a young United States merchant marine officer, now dead, wrote to his mother from on board ship in the Pacific: "This country may go to war with Japan in the near future, but they will not bother this ship, for we have a million dollar cargo of munitions for Japan. They put soldiers on the ship in the Canal to protect the cargo—a cargo of war supplies that the Japs will shoot those same soldiers with if they get the chance. But are the big shots cleaning up! They are making such huge profits it is unbelievable."

We all know what happened to the scrap iron and other war materials the United States sold to the Japanese before Pearl Harbor. They were later shot back to kill and wound our boys in the bloody Pacific war.

There is an old saying that "history repeats itself." The French embody the same idea in a proverb to the effect that the more history changes the more it is the same.

Each day some of the ECA and MAP countries sell strategic war materials such as steel and machine tools to the Reds. Each day the American people are called on to give similar materials to these same countries in Western Europe.

The Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce has reported that "Russia and her satellites have received from Western sources significant quantities of materials vital to their war potential." The committee also found that "undesirably large quantities of items which meet Chinese Communist priority needs

continue to reach Red China due to inadequate export controls and policies of many Western countries."

Here are some of the items carried to Red China by British and other ships: asphalt (used to surface runways for jet aircraft in China), ball and roller bearings, oil and steel bars.

The Kem Amendment

The law known as the Kem Amendment was intended to discourage this traffic. It provided that the United States government should not send economic aid to countries selling strategic war materials to the Reds. The Kem Amendment was first "suspended" by the President. It has now been repealed and replaced with the weak, discretionary Battle Act, which leaves it up to President Truman to say whether aid shall be shut off to countries engaged in such trade.

The countries in Western Europe who are making these sales to the Reds do not deny the facts. They undertake to justify the traffic. The argument runs something like this: The countries in Western Europe need foreign trade, particularly with Eastern Europe and China. When they want to do business, they have to sell what their customers want to buy. The Reds currently (for some reason or other) are interested in strategic war materials. Therefore, these Western European countries supply their requirements.

When former British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison was in Washington last September, he defended this traffic by pointing out

that trade was a two-way street. This is true. But the road to a lonely, new-dug grave with a white cross is a one-way street. That is a bourne from which no traveler returns.

On October 12, 1951 the Administration, with the President's approval, granted an export license to General Motors to ship \$210,000 worth of truck and automobile parts behind the Iron Curtain to Poland. The equipment is such as could be used in military transport units as large as 6-by-6 trucks. It is anticipated that ultimately applications amounting to a total dollar value of \$1 million will be granted.

It is known that Polish ships are supplying Communist China with strategic chemicals, rails, sheet steel, tires and trucks. There will be no occasion for surprise if American truck parts are found being used to repair trucks transporting arms, ammunition and troops to Communist forces in the Far East. If Russia decides to move into Western Europe—and God forbid this—will American trucks furnished under lend-lease and lately refurbished by fresh parts from America be in the vanguard of that movement?

Administration apologists for this deal informed me that it is a "calculated risk." In other words, they are gambling with the lives of American boys.

C. E. Wilson, president of General Motors Corporation, has written me that he has received many letters from stockholders and others who have written the Corporation protesting the truck-parts shipments.

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by Eugene S. Gregg

Mr. Gregg is vice-president and general manager of the Westex Corporation and chairman of the Technical Services Committee of the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Gregg's committee is now at work preparing a more extensive policy statement on East-West trade.

WE OBJECT, and rightly so, to our allies and friends supplying countries behind the Iron Curtain with materials and equipment capable of increasing the Soviet military potential. The dilemma of East-West trade is that if such trade takes place, this strengthens the economy of the Soviet bloc. But if such trade does not take place, this seriously weakens the economy of some of our best friends among the free nations.

Today the United States government is pursuing two distinct—and seemingly contradictory—approaches to East-West trade. On the one hand, United States delegates at international organization meetings have repeatedly in public statements endorsed East-West trade. On the other hand, certain elements of the trade which our allies maintain with the Soviet-bloc countries are classified as undesirable by United States export controls.

This apparent contradiction can be easily explained. We do not object to exports of consumer goods (and even certain kinds of semimanufactured goods) from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. The American public and the Administration have been seriously concerned, however, over exports of *strategically* important articles, especially machinery, from Western Europe to the Soviet orbit.

Since the start of the Korean war American concern over exports from Western Europe to Iron Curtain countries has mounted. In particular, the United States Congress has passed a number of legislative acts

aiming to stop economic assistance to any country which exports to the Soviet Union or its satellites arms, armaments, military materials, or commodities which our Secretary of Defense certifies as being of military value.

West Needs Imports

A good deal of friction has developed between the United States and our allies as a result of the various acts passed by Congress and of the discussion to which they gave rise. This indicates that the problem has important aspects which thus far have remained unexplored. The principal among these is the realization that there is an *import* side to East-West trade. No rational solution to the problem can be reached by looking on the *export* side alone, as our legislators seem to do.

Trade between Western Europe and the Soviet bloc is to a large extent comparable to outright barter. This is largely due to the fact that trade behind the Iron Curtain is conducted by state trading-monopolies. This eliminates the usual methods of a free-market economy. In a discussion of East-West trade, equal importance must be placed on the commodities which Western Europe obtains from Eastern Europe and those goods which are exported by the Western European countries to the Soviet bloc. Elementary though this consideration may appear, it has been prominently absent from the various bills enacted by our Congress.

If the Western European countries sell to the Soviet bloc, it is primarily—or even exclusively—in order to

secure goods which can be obtained on terms that are most favorable as compared to those existing elsewhere. The principal imports of Western European countries from Eastern Europe are coal, timber, steel, sugar, meat, eggs and tobacco. As compared with 1938, the 1950 imports of coal from the East were on approximately the prewar level, while all other imports were considerably below that level. There has been a significant decline in East-West trade for most items between 1949 and 1950, except for meat and eggs, the imports of which have been considerably increased.

In addition, Western Europe has imported a considerable volume of bread grain and coarse grain (corn, barley and oats) from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. The share of Eastern Europe in these imports has declined, however, from 19 per cent in the period 1934-1938 to 10 per cent in 1949 and 1950.

For individual countries the dependence on specific imports from Eastern Europe continues to be quite substantial. In the case of Italy, for example, 14.5 per cent of all coal imports in 1950 came from the Soviet bloc. Since Italy has no coal production, this figure represents the percentage of Italian coal requirements satisfied by imports from the Soviet-controlled area. In the same year 21 per cent of cattle imports, 82 per cent of hogs, 50 per cent of eggs, 18 per cent of potatoes, 14 per cent of wheat, that were imported into Italy came from Eastern Europe.

Exports from Western Europe to the Iron Curtain countries consist largely of manufactured goods. It is understandable that these should be viewed with concern by the United States government, even though it would appear that no military-end

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Kem

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Mr. Wilson said that "the general tenor of these letters was that General Motors thought only of profits and would try to make profits even to the point of trading with the enemy. The writers of these letters did not understand that General Motors was only carrying out national policy."

This was the same phrase used by the State Department in opposing the Kem Amendment. They said it was contrary to "national policy." The present "national policy" of the United States seems to dictate that European profits and trade shall have priority over the lives and safety of American boys. I do not believe this "national policy" is acceptable to the fathers and mothers of America.

Opponents of the Kem Amendment set up a straw man and proceed to demolish it. We must not cut off *all* trade between the West and the East, they say. No one so far as I know has advocated this. The question involved in the Kem Amendment is very simple: Shall we continue to give assistance at the expense of the American taxpayer to countries that continue to sell *strategic war materials* to be used in killing and wounding our men in Korea? All we ask of the beneficiaries of our gifts is that they place upon themselves the same restraints that we place by law upon our own citizens.

Gregg

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items of any kind are exported to the Soviet bloc.

Any goods the Soviet bloc needs add undoubtedly to its economic potential and therefore, at least indirectly, to its military potential. The same, however, is true of goods re-

ceived by our Western European friends from the Iron Curtain area. In the end a balance must be struck between advantages we and our allies get from trade with Eastern Europe and the advantages which that trade gives to the Soviet bloc. Such a balance is not easy to strike, and to form a judgment on this matter is primarily a function of diplomacy, not of basic legislative action.

What Is Alternative?

Without attempting to express a final judgment on this matter, it is important to draw attention to the fact that imports from Eastern Europe could only be discontinued by Western Europe if the same commodities (or adequate substitutes) could be secured elsewhere. We cannot urge our allies to curtail, for political reasons, their trade with the Soviet bloc unless we are prepared to cooperate with them in developing alternative trade channels.

On paper it should be relatively easy to obtain somewhere else many of the basic commodities which the Western European countries import from the Soviet sphere. In practice there are three major complicating factors.

First, the alternative sources of supply must be of comparable price. Should these goods be considerably more expensive, there would result an additional burden on the already weak economies of many of the Western European countries. Second, supplies from alternative sources must be shipped to the country of destination. Shipping space is becoming increasingly scarce, and it might not be feasible to ship additional large volumes of bulky commodities across oceans. Third, countries which would receive imports from these alternative sources of supply must be in a position to pay for them. In the case of East-West trade,

transactions are essentially barter deals. In the case of alternative sources of supply, money payments would be necessary. To the extent that these transactions would involve dollar payments, they might be a source of extreme difficulties under present circumstances.

Basically, East-West trade leaves us with this choice:

If we cut off all trade between the West and the East, the American taxpayer will have to let these countries collapse economically and perhaps politically or else to underwrite the costs of preventing these economies from collapsing completely. And if these countries collapse, the Iron Curtain will certainly move further West.

Or we can take the more intelligent approach of carefully planning alternative trade channels, which in the long run would eliminate the current economic necessity of Western Europe trading with the East. But this solution cannot become effective overnight.

FPA Bookshelf

World Economic Report 1949-50. New York, United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 1951. \$2.50.

The first comprehensive review of world economic conditions to be published by the UN since the appearance of the 1948 survey, this report is devoted to a summary of major developments in domestic economic conditions and to a more detailed analysis of international commercial and monetary problems.

Economic Survey of Europe in 1950, prepared by the Research and Planning Division, Economic Commission for Europe. Geneva, United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, 1951. \$2.50. (Sales No. 1951.II.E.1)

Caravan: The Story of The Middle East, by Carleton S. Coon. New York, Holt, 1951. \$5.

This compact, popularly written narrative by a prominent anthropologist at the University of Pennsylvania embodies a wealth of detail about the sociological, economic, geographic, historic and archeological aspects of the Middle East. Invaluable as background material.



Mixing Right and Left in Europe

While the attention of the United States is focused on valiant efforts, European and American, to create the framework of Western union, each of the nations involved is experiencing internal political realignments that may profoundly alter the climate of opinion in which the proposed union would have to operate. Traditional party distinctions are being blurred or erased by a common preoccupation with economic and social problems, accentuated by persisting international tension.

In Britain Mr. Churchill is no more able than Mr. Attlee to escape from the harsh realities created by Britain's diminished economic resources and its resulting weakness in areas of Asia and the Middle East aflame with nationalism. Nor is Mr. Churchill more inclined than Aneurin Bevan, whom he has derided, to let Britain become so dependent on the United States as to abandon the initiative its limited military strength still permits.

In France, too, economic preoccupations and fear of undue dependence on the United States in the East-West struggle overshadow party considerations. The new cabinet formed on January 20 by the young lawyer Edgar Faure, a Radical, is drawn from the same parties as that of his predecessor, René Pleven, who was forced out of office by the opposition of the Socialists. Like M. Pleven, Faure, who has also assumed the thorny responsibilities of finance minister, hopes to steer a middle course between the Scylla of the Gaullists and the Charybdis of the Communists. Like M. Pleven, he has failed to win the support of the Socialist party, which views with dis-

trust the ruling combination of the Radical, liberal Catholic MRP, Independent Conservative and Peasant parties. This combination, in the opinion of the Socialists, has three main objectionable features: the proclericalism of the MRP, which has revived the issue of state aid to church schools; the opposition of the Conservative and Peasant groups to the existing social security program; and what the Socialists regard as the intransigence of the coalition toward nationalist movements in Indo-China and French North Africa.

Where Is the Left?

It would be a mistake, however, to think of the Socialist party in France as "radical." On the contrary, the non-Communist left, including a large part of the workers, believe that the Socialist leaders have moved so close to the policy of the business groups as to become often indistinguishable from them in their economic ideas, and contend they have yielded unduly to American influence. It is conceivable that discontented elements within Socialist ranks might form an independent group of their own, but they are not likely to associate with the Communists.

The French, who traditionally like to keep moving "à la gauche," find themselves today with no important democratically-minded leftist group to join. The most striking aspect of this situation is that now socialist-minded elements, sometimes more vigorous than members of the Socialist party itself, can be found in each of the principal parties, notably in the pro-clerical MRP and in the ranks of de Gaulle's Rally of the

French People, which is otherwise usually classified as of the right.

The Gaullists, it should be recalled, include former Communist sympathizers, among them Jacques Soustelle, who has emerged as a significant figure in current political negotiations, and the brilliant writer André Malraux. And while Americans usually think of the Communists alone as being opposed to the United States, the Gaullists, who unlike the Communists do not support the U.S.S.R., want France to become less dependent on American military and economic aid. The Gaullist spokesmen particularly object to unconditional American use of bases in France and French North Africa.

"The essential fact which dominates and paralyzes French political life," writes Maurice Duverger in the independent and influential Paris newspaper *Le Monde*, is that the National Assembly stands "clearly to the right of the country it tries to govern." He says: "The quarantine in which the 100 Communist deputies are placed does not cancel the existence of their 5 million electors, who in any case are not necessarily traitors or supporters of the Soviets, but workers and people of small means who want a fair division of the national income and of taxation. And all the parliamentary agitation of the moderates and the independents does not alter the fact that they only represent a mere 13 per cent of the electorate."

Under the circumstances the existing party alignments no longer correspond to political realities. The old parties, as one French observer has

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in fact helped create strong resentment against the French. That assimilation did not succeed has been implicitly admitted by France, which in 1947, yielding to the pressure of Algerians for political reform, introduced a new organic statute providing, among other things, for a division of the electorate into two "colleges"—the French and the natives.

Unable to accept assimilation and dissatisfied with existing conditions, Algerian natives have increasingly turned to nationalism. For many years the moderates provided much of the leadership. These moderates, while seeking reforms and a greater voice for Algeria in governing their own affairs, were not inimical to the continued presence of the French in Algeria. Now even most moderates are talking of Algeria for Algerians and the establishment of an Algerian republic.

The prospect of an amicable disposition of the nationalist question in the Maghreb is not promising. Arguments that minimize the nationalist issue and attempt to discredit the nationalist leaders as fanatical extremists do not improve the situation, which must be met boldly and honestly if the population

of North Africa—both European and Muslim—is not to suffer disastrously.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Carleton S. Coon, *Caravan* (New York, Holt, 1951) and "North Africa" in Ralph Linton, ed., *Most of the World* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949); L. Gray Cowan, "The New Face of Algeria," *Political Science Quarterly*, September and December 1951; Charles-André Julien, "Crisis and Reform in French North Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1951.

(Dr. Rivlin, of the Department of Political Science of Brooklyn College, has worked on African affairs with the Office of Strategic Services and the Department of Trusteeship of the United Nations Secretariat. He spent the first half of 1951 in French North Africa under a Social Science Research Council grant.)

Spotlight

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pointed out, are exploding from within. Will each of them produce new offshoots, bring forth new leaders who, however much they differ along political lines, may find areas of agreement regarding economic and social reforms and foreign policy?

A somewhat comparable realignment is under way in Italy, where Ugo La Malfa, minister of foreign trade in the cabinet of Christian Democratic Premier Alcide de Gasperi, has appealed for "an agreement among the democratic secular parties." La Malfa is a member of the Republican party, the only minority party in the de Gasperi cabinet (other Republicans in the govern-

ment are Randolfo Pacciardi, minister of defense, and Carlo Sforza, ex-foreign minister, now without portfolio). He hopes to bring the Republicans, the conservative but anti-clerical Liberals who represent business, and the Social Democrats together on a common platform which would combine opposition to growing Church intervention in Italian affairs with demands for more social reforms.

The Italian Social Democrats, like the Socialists in France, are at present in a state of internal struggle and disintegration. As in France, too, but to an even greater degree, the exclusion of the Communists from administration does not exorcise Communist influence, particularly in a period when unemployment persists close to the two-million level.

Until Europe gets some assurance that long-term improvement can be achieved by democratic methods, communism is expected to retain its hold in France and Italy. For communism is not merely an extraneous factor manufactured in Russia, but as Jean-Marie Domenach, co-author of *Communism in Western Europe*, recently published by the Cornell University Press, points out, it "is intrinsically and, so to speak, physiologically connected with the European crisis."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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by Sidney C. Sufrin, former chairman of
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